The Polynomial Modular Number System (PMNS) is an integer number system designed to speed up arithmetic operations modulo a prime p. Such a system is defined by a tuple B = (p, n, γ, ρ ,E) where E ∈ Z[X] and E(γ) ≡ 0 (mod p). In a PMNS, an element a of Z/pZ is represented by a polynomial A such that:
I. Introduction
Most protocols in public key cryptography require modular arithmetic operations over large integers, like for instance RSA [28] or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [21] . In practice, these operations must be fast and secure. In order to speed up modular arithmetic, specific representations of integers such as the Residue Number System (RNS [17] , [3] ) or the Polynomial Modular Number System (PMNS [5] , [6] , [25] , [26] ) have been studied. The security concerns the resistance to side channel analysis, especially when the implementation targets embedded devices.
Side channel attacks (SCA) use the leakage of information during the execution of a cryp-tographic protocol in order to fully or partially recover the secret [22] . The leakage of information can be the execution time, the power consumption or the electromagnetic emission of the implemented algorithm. SCA have proven to be efficient in ECC [1] . Countermeasures to those attacks should be included in the implementation of the scalar multiplication in ECC. This operation is the main and most critical operation in ECC. It consists in adding a point P on an elliptic curve E, k times. Existing countermeasures rely on the addition of randomness during the computation. The randomness could be included in the scalar k [13] , [12] , [29] , [10] , [9] or in the coordinates of the point P [13] . It is also possible to randomize the instructions flow of the field multiplications computed during the points addition [11] . Another strategy is to introduce randomization at the arithmetical level, which is the purpose of this paper.
Our goal is to protect elliptic curve scalar multiplication (ECSM) against SCA [22] using the PMNS to represent the coordinates of any curve points. All operations involved in PMNS representation use regular algorithms so they are intrinsically Simple Power Analysis (SPA) immune. Thus, it should be sufficient to use regular algorithm (like the Montgomery powering ladder [24] ) to perform the ECSM in order to be safe against SPA attacks. To protect the classical scalar multiplication kP against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks, we first show how the conversion process which maps an integer to a representative in PMNS can be easily modified to randomize the base point P. Next, we show how to randomize all intermediate values involved in the scalar multiplication by adding some randomness in the PMNS modular multiplication primitive.
Randomization of the scalar k can be done using classical countermeasures [15] .
The remaining of the paper is organised as follow. We recall the principal definition and properties of a PMNS representation in Section II. In Section III we present both the randomization of inputs (Sec. III-B) and the multiplication (Sec. III-C). In Section IV, we give costs of modular multiplications in PMNS and describe some specific advantages of PMNS regarding some attacks like Goubin's [18] . We conclude in Section V.
II. Background onPMNS
Modular arithmetic is one of the key point for efficient and secure cryptographic applications. A challenge is to obtain a number system which permits fast modular computations over large integers.
Bajard and al. [6] introduced the Modular Number System (MNS) which is a generalization of positional number systems. The main idea is that any integer x = n i=0 x i β i , can be seen as a polynomial evaluated in β. In MNS, the choice of β is free under certain conditions. This number system is defined by the tuple (p, n, γ, ρ) as follows.
Definition II.1. A modular number system (MNS)
B is defined by a tuple (p, n, γ, ρ), such that for every integer 0
x < p, there exists a vector
with |v i | < ρ and 0 < ρ, γ < p. In that case, we say that V (or equivalently the polynomial V(X) = v 0 + v 1 .X + · · · + v n−1 .X n−1 ) is a representation of x in B and we notate V ≡ x B , which means that V(γ) ≡ x (mod p). In this system, arithmetic operations are performed on polynomials. An example of MNS can be found in [6] .
The product T of two MNS numbers V ≡ x B and W ≡ y B satisfies T(γ) ≡ x y (mod p). However, T might not be in B because its degree could be greater or equal to n. The Polynomial Modular Number System is an extension of MNS which keep the degree of the product bound by n.
Definition II.2. A Polynomial Modular Number
System (PMNS) [6] is a MNS where γ is a root modulo p of an unitary polynomial E(X) ∈ Z[X], such that deg(E) = n and E ∞ is "small". The polynomial E is named external reduction polynomial. The PMNS B is defined by the tuple (p, n, γ, ρ ,E). In this system, arithmetic operations are performed on polynomials modulo E.
Several methods exists for computing the PMNS parameters. Plantard [26] give a building method for very efficient PMNS. Its main drawback is that the parameter p cannot be set. It is computed through the process. In [7] , [14] the authors show that it is always possible to build many PMNS for a given modulus p.
In PMNS, the multiplication T = VW (mod E),
However, even if deg(T) < n, T might not be a representation of x y (mod p) in B, because its coefficients could be greater or equal to ρ. In order to get this representation in B, a special primitive called the internal reduction has to be applied. The operation that reduces the size of the polynomial coefficients is described in Section II-A.
In [26] , [6] , the authors show how to use PMNS to speed up modular arithmetic. The main PMNS primitives are recalled in Section II-B, II-C and II-D.
A. Internal reduction
The goal of the internal reduction is to maintain small enough coefficients of polynomials in PMNS. Let B = (p, n, γ, ρ ,E) be a PMNS. The internal reduction process maps a polynomial V(X) ∈ Z[X] to a polynomialṼ(X) ∈ Z[X] such thatṼ(γ) ≡ V(γ) (mod p), Ṽ ∞ V ∞ and degṼ = deg V. We describe two ways to perform this operation.
1) Internal reduction via a Mongtomery-like method: In [25] , the authors give a reduction procedure similar to the Mongtomery algorithm (Alg. 1). It outputs a polynomialṼ such that V ≡ V(γ)r −1 (mod p). Using this version of the internal reduction requires to convert the elements of Z/pZ in the Montgomery domain during the conversion process into the PMNS. An element a ∈ Z/pZ is represented by a polynomial A ∈ B such that A(γ) ≡ a.r (mod p). This way, we ensure the consistency of operations in the PMNS while using this method for coefficients reduction.
The choice of the polynomial M to ensure the existence of M is discussed in [14] . The
Proposition II.1, from [25] , gives a bound on the coefficients of the polynomial computed with the Algorithm 1. Here, E(X) = X n −λ, with λ ∈ Z\{0}.
We will generalise this bound in Section II-B for E(X) = X n − Δ(X).
2) Internal reduction via a Babaï-like method: The Babaï-like algorithm (Alg. 2) does not require to maintain the elements of Z/pZ in another domain and does not attempt to compute the result by using a polynomial M with specific properties. In this approach, we consider the Euclidean lattice L B associated with the PMNS B. Here, L B is the set of all polynomials having γ as root modulo p and which degree is at most n − 1:
The lattice L B is defined from one of its bases, whose elements are A 1 (X) = p and A i+1 (X) = X i − γ i , for 1 ≤ i < n, from which we compute D, the LLL-reduced base of L B , and the Gram-Schmidt base D obtained from D, whose elements are orthogonal but not necessarily in L B . [27] . We can deduce from [16] and [27] that:
B. Multiplication
The elements in PMNS are polynomials of degree at most n − 1. Their multiplication is done using classical polynomial multiplication. However, the result (of degree at most 2 n − 2) must be Algorithm 2 RedCoeff -Babaï like [16] Require: The polynomial E is such that:
In order to reduce a polynomial V modulo E, we proceed step by step by replacing the term X n in V by Δ(X) until deg(V) < n. We consider here PMNS with reduction polynomials E of degree n ≥ 2, with Δ(X) = δ k X k +· · ·+δ 1 X + δ 0 and k ≤ n 2 . From this technique, we compute polynomials of degree lower than n to represent the powers
Then, any polynomial V can be reduced modulo E by multiplying the vector of the coefficients of V by the (2 n−1)×n matrix S whose rows represent the coefficients of each power
We denote s the 1-norm S 1 of the matrix S, and deduce the following proposition.
From this proposition the bound given in Proposition II.1 can be rewritten by substituting |λ| by s.
C. Addition
Addition procedure is done using classical polynomial addition in Z[X] followed by an internal reduction in order to obtain a result in B.
D. Conversion procedures
The conversion procedures maps an integer to a representation in B and vice-versa. They depend on internal reduction step that can be achieved using any one of the two procedure previously described. The corresponding algorithms are descibed in section 4.3 of [6] .
III. Randomization of the scalar multiplication in elliptic curve cryptography
Our motivation is to present algorithms that will ensure the resistance of the scalar multiplication against existing SCA. The scalar multiplication in ECC takes a point P over a public elliptic curve, a private integer k and computes kP. This operation can be implemented using the classical double and add method, but is not resistant to SCA [22] . The Montgomery ladder [24] and its variant [8] , [23] , [19] , [20] are more resistant but are still attackable [1] . The recent survey [1] presents existing side channel attacks and countermeasures for the scalar multiplication over ECC. Existing countermeasures rely either on the randomization of the scalar k [13] , [12] , [29] , [10] , [9] , or on the randomization of the point P. The randomization of point P can be calculated using the randomization of projective coordinates [13] or the addition of a random point R [13] . Only one countermeasure is designed on the field multiplication using a random permutation [11] .
We provide here two possibilities to randomize the scalar multiplication:
• randomization of each initial coordinate of P each time this point is used during the scalar multiplication algorithm. This protects against SCA, where the attacker tries to find out the secret using the knowledge of the point P [22] and ensures the resistance to specific point attacks [18] , [2] . We use either Algorithm 3 or Algorithm 4 as a conversion procedure depending on the RedCoeff method that will be used later for internal reduction;
• randomization of each multiplication a × b for a and b in PMNS representation to be more resistant to SCA, using either Algorithm 5 or Algorithm 6.
A. Random polynomial generation
In order to randomize data in the PMNS, we generate a random polynomial Z ∈ Z[X] such that: Z ∞ ≤ z and deg Z < n with z ∈ N. The value z is chosen during the PMNS generation process. This integer z defines the minimum number of distinct representations of any element of Z/pZ in B. Once z is fixed, there are exactly (2 z + 1) n polynomials Z. We will show how to use Z in order to guarantee that there are at least (2 z + 1) n distinct representations of any element of Z/pZ.
Hereafter we use a function randPoly(z) for generating random polynomials which coefficients are in the set {−z, . . ., z}. We consider this function to be safe (see [4] for example).
B. Randomization of the input data
Here, we show how to randomize the conversion procedure from binary to the PMNS in order to obtain randomized input data. Let B = (p, n, γ, ρ , E) be a PMNS. Let a ∈ Z/pZ be an integer. We want to compute a randomized representation of a in B.
1) Conversion randomization using the Mongtomery-like method: This algorithm is a slight modification of the initial conversion algorithm described in [6] . The randomized conversion method introduces a polynomial multiplication (line 4) before the internal reduction. Doing so, we ensure that with the same input and different random polynomials this algorithm produces different representations.
Theorem III.1. Let B = (p, n, γ, ρ ,E) a PMNS. Let a ∈ Z/pZ be an integer and r = 2 j , j ≥ 1. Let M ∈ B be a polynomial such that: M(γ) ≡ 0 (mod p) and gcd(r, resultant(E, M)) = 1. Let z be the input of the randPoly procedure. We consider B, a, r, M and z as the inputs and data of Algorithm 3. Let m = M ∞ . If ρ and r satisfy ρ ≥ 2 n s m 1 + z + z r and r ≥ 2 n s ρ,, then Algorithm 3 can generate (2 z + 1) n distinct outputs, all representing a and belonging to the PMNS B = (p, n, γ, ρ ,E).
Proof:
We give a sketch of the proof. First, it can be easily checked that V(γ) ≡ U(γ)
Algorithm 3 Randomized conversion to PMNS via Montgomery
Require: a ∈ Z/pZ and B = (p, n, γ, ρ , E) Ensure: A(γ) ≡ a r (mod p) Data: P i ≡ (ρ i ) B , for i = 0, . . ., n − 1, z ∈ N, r = 2 j , j ≥ 1 and M ∈ B with M(γ) ≡ 0 (mod p) and gcd(r, resultant(E, M)) = 1. 1: Z ← randPoly(z) 2: a ← a r 2 (mod p) 3: 7: return A (mod p). Next, in order to ensure A ∞ < ρ we choose r and ρ such that r ≥ 2 n s ρ and ρ ≥ 2 n s m 1 + z + z r . Thus, A is a representation of a r (mod p) in the PMNS. Finally, we prove by contradiction that, for the same entry a ∈ Z/pZ and two distinct random polynomials, this algorithm returns two distinct outputs A 1 and A 2 .
2) Randomization using the Babaï-like method:
This algorithm is a slight modification of Algorithm 2 using the Babai-like method for coefficients reduction. Here, the representations in the PMNS system are seen as vectors, the i-th coordinate corresponding to the i-th coefficient of the polynomial form of the representation. We consider a PMNS B and its associated lattice L B with a LLL-reduced base, denoted D. The randomization of the Babaï-like method is based on two random vectors: 
6:
A ← A − c × D n−i+1 7: end for 8: return A B = (p, n, γ, ρ ,E).
Proof:
We only give a sketch of the proof. First, it is obvious that the polynomial T, in Algorithm 4, is such that: T(γ) ≡ a (mod p). Moreover, as D is a LLL-reduced base of the lattice associated to B, it is always true that A(γ) ≡ T(γ) (mod p). Thus, A(γ) ≡ a (mod p). Next condition on ρ guarantees that A will be in the PMNS after the internal reduction process. Finally, for two distinct random polynomials Z 1 and Z 2 with the same entry a ∈ Z/pZ, it can be proved that the algorithm returns two distinct outputs A 1 and A 2 .
C. Randomization of the multiplication
In PMNS the randomization of the multiplication provides an additional level of security when used with the randomized conversion. However, combining these two randomizations leads to stronger constraints on some parameters of the PMNS.
In both versions, we randomize one input in order to randomize all the intermediate results.
Moreover, for the same input and different random polynomials (shift vectors for Babaï), the results computed by these algorithms are different representations of the same integer in Z/pZ.
1) Randomization via Montgomery:
This algorithm is a variation of the Montgomery modular multiplication.
Algorithm 5 Randomized Montgomery PMNS Multiplication
Require: B = (p, n, γ, ρ , E) and A, B ∈ B Ensure:
Let z ∈ N be the bound of the random polynomials and r = 2 j , j ≥ 1. Let M ∈ B be a polynomial such that: M(γ) ≡ 0 (mod p) and gcd(r, resultant(E, M)) = 1. Let A and B be two elements of B . We consider B, A, B, M, z and r as the inputs and data of Algorithm 5. Let m = M ∞ . If ρ and r satisfy ρ ≥ 2 n s m (2z + 1) and r ≥ 2 n s ρ × max z, 5 4 , then Algorithm 5 can generate (2 z+1) n distinct outputs, all representing A(γ)B(γ)r −1 (mod p) and belonging to the PMNS B = (p, n, γ, ρ ,E).
Proof:
We only give a sketch of the proof which is similar to the proof of Th. III.1. First, we have M(γ) ≡ 0 (mod p), so J(γ) ≡ 0 (mod p) and Q(γ)M(γ) ≡ 0 (mod p). Thus, R(γ) ≡ A(γ)B(γ)r −1 (mod p). Next, R ∞ < 5 4 n s ρ 2 /r + n s m(2 z + 1). Hence, for r ≥ 2 n s ρ × max(z, 5 4 ), R ∞ < ρ 2 + n s m(2 z + 1). This way, condition on ρ guarantees that R ∞ < ρ. Finally, it can be proven that for two distinct random polynomials and the same entries A and B, the algorithm returns two distinct outputs.
Instead of using the bounds on ρ and r from Theorem III.1 for conversion in the PMNS, the bounds of Theorem III.3 have to be used for conversion if multiplications are to be randomized as described above.
2) Randomization via Babaï: This conversion lies on the same principles than the randomized conversion described in Section III-B2. The randomness is introduced in the multiplication trough the mask V and the translation Z. 
IV. Cost evaluation
We describe here the theoretical cost estimation of the multiplication algorithms presented in the previous section. They are expressed as a function of the number of w-bit size multiplications, additions, divisions and shifts.
We assume that the inputs of these algorithms belong to B = (p, n, γ, ρ ,E), with ρ = 2 w , E(X) = X n − λ and λ = ±2 u with w, u ∈ N. It has been shown in [14] that it is always possible to build such PMNS. As an example, with such notations the addition of two c-bit integers requires c/w w-bit additions.
Let M and A respectively denote the multiplication and the sum of two w-bits integers, I the division by an integer of 2 w log 2 (n) bits and R the cost of one call to the randPoly function. We also respectively denote S i l and S i r a left shift and a right shift of i bits. In Table I , we compare the cost of the randomized multiplication in PMNS with their non-randomized counterparts. The nonrandomized version is a simple polynomial multiplication followed by a Babaï-like (Alg. 2) or Montgomery-like (Alg. 1) internal reduction.
In order to protect the ECSM kP against DPA attacks, classical countermeasures randomize beforehand the scalar k and the point P [15] . Then, during the computation process, the intermediate points that are computed are also randomized. The expectation of these approaches is to prevent an attacker to get information about k or to make useful assumption about the intermediate values of the ECSM.
In classical binary representation, these common countermeasures appear to be inefficient against Goubin's attack [18] . This attack can be done on curves that have at least one point with one coordinate equals to zero. On such a curve, using such a point, the attacker can find information about the secret key. It is possible to thwart this attack at the cost of an additional ECSM which must be done in addition to the common countermeasures [15] .
A first advantage of our PMNS based randomized solutions is that regardless the type of curve, this attack cannot be performed. Indeed, there are at least (2z + 1) n distinct representatives of 0 ∈ Z/pZ and these representatives do not have special shapes. Thus, for z big enough, the attacker should not be able to exploit any information to perform this attack. Consequently, the only randomization of the conversion process using Algorithms 3 or 4 suffices to counter the Goubin's attack even if nonrandomized multiplications are used later.
Another advantage of our approach is that it operates at arithmetic level. Hence it can be combined with other classical countermeasures (point blinding, scalar blinding) to randomize P and the intermediate points.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we show for the first time how to use the redundancy of the PMNS to define arithmetical protections against DPA attacks. We described how to randomize the inputs during the forward conversion to PMNS through two methods. We also gave two randomized modular multiplications in PMNS. These methods can be used to apply classical countermeasures on the elliptic curve scalar multiplication kP. Moreover, we showed that randomizing only the conversion process suffices to protect against Goubin's attack. As a comparison, a safe countermeasure using the classical binary representation, requires an additional ECSM kR for some random point R [15] . These results are a first step in using randomization for arithmetic operations in PMNS. This work opens up new perspectives in the area of countermeasures for SCA attacks. A deeper study on practical efficiency and an exhaustive comparison with existing countermeasures will soon follow in order to establish the relevance of these methods . . .
TABLE I
Theoretical cost of operations,where E(X) = X n − λ with λ = ±2 u , r = 2 j .
Mult. Method
Montgomery-like Babaï-like Polynomial Mult. n 2 M + (2n 2 − 4n + 2)A n 2 M + (2n 2 − 4n + 2) A External reduct.
2(n − 1)A + (n − 1)S u l 2(n − 1)A + (n − 1)S u l Internal reduct. 
